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This research analyzes two groundwater conservation policies in the Kansas High Plains
located within the Ogallala aquifer: 1) cost-share assistance to increase irrigation efficiency;
and 2) incentive payments to convert irrigated crop production to dryland crop production. To
compare the cost-effectiveness of these two policies, a dynamic model simulated a repre-
sentative irrigator’s optimal technology choice, crop selection, and irrigation water use over
time. The results suggest that the overall water-saving effectiveness can be improved when
different policy tools are considered under different conditions. High prevailing crop prices
greatly reduce irrigators’ incentive to give up irrigation and therefore cause low enrollment
and ineffectiveness of the incentive payment program. In areas with low aquifer-saturated
thickness, the incentive payment program is more effective, whereas in areas with relatively
higher water availability, the cost-share program could be a better choice.
KeyWords: cost-share program, incentive payments, Ogallala aquifer, dynamic optimization,
groundwater conservation
JEL Classifications: Q30, Q32, Q38
Water scarcity is a major problem worldwide
and one that is expected to be exacerbated in
many regions by climate change and by pop-
ulation growth. Because irrigated agriculture is
a major consumer of water in these regions,
growing scarcity issues have prompted a renewed
policy focus on agricultural water conservation.
One of the largest water-scarce agricultural
regions in the world is the High Plains in the
central United States, where land use is domi-
nated by irrigated agriculture supplied by the
Ogallala aquifer. The aquifer underlies portions
of eight states from South Dakota to Texas and
in many areas has been in steady decline for
decades. In the Kansas portion of the Ogallala
aquifer, irrigation consumes approximately three
million acre-feet of water per year, which ac-
counts for over 90% of total groundwater with-
drawal in the state. Given the current decline
rate, certain intensively irrigated areas in western
Kansas have an estimated usable lifetime of the
aquifer less than 50 years and in some areas, the
point of effective exhaustion has already been
reached.
The Ogallala aquifer is a common pool re-
source. The groundwater stock is not individ-
ually owned and cannot be partitioned among
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individuals. Irrigators have the incentive to
only consider their own profit when deciding
on the best water consumption and to ignore the
effect of water withdrawal on the entire water
stock. In this situation, the aquifer will be de-
pleted faster than the economically efficient rate
(Shah, Zilberman, and Chakravorty, 1995). Pol-
icy intervention is needed to solve or alleviate the
common pool problem of groundwater use.
A common conservation practice imple-
mented is to improve irrigation efficiency. Ir-
rigation efficiency is the ratio of effective water
use to gross irrigation. Effective water use, also
called consumptive use, is the amount of water
beneficially used by crops; gross irrigation is the
amount of water diverted from thewater source. In
Kansas, eligible producers can receive cost-share
assistance for conversion from flood irrigation
systems to sprinklers and from low-efficiency
center pivot sprinklers to high-efficiency ones.
Although more efficient irrigation technologies
are suggested to be water-saving, there is sub-
stantial controversy in the literature on the con-
servation effects of efficiency improvements
(Huffaker andWhittlesey, 1995, 2003; Peterson
and Ding, 2005; Ward and Pulido-Velazquez,
2008). More efficient irrigation technologies
reduce the cost of effective water, and profit-
maximizing producers will respond to this cost
change by increasing effective water use. Be-
cause the amount of gross irrigation is the ratio
of effective water and the efficiency rate,
whether it increases or decreases after the ef-
ficiency improvement is undetermined. Addi-
tionally, increased efficiency might change
producers’ decisions on irrigated acreage and/
or cropping systems and thus could cause more
water to be diverted as a result of expansions
at the extensive margin (Moore, Gollehon, and
Carey, 1994). Therefore, the water-conserving
effect of more efficient irrigation technologies
remains an empirical question.
Another frequently discussed conservation
practice is to convert irrigated crop production to
dryland crop production. Incentive payments are
provided to participating producers for tempo-
rarily or permanently retiring their consumptive
water rights. Wheeler et al. (2008) compared the
economic efficiency of short-term and long-term
water rights buyout policies. The difficulty with
these policies is to determine an appropriate
payment rate in the absence of an active water
market. Because producers are diversified in their
cropping systems, production practices, and hy-
drologic conditions, the compensation payment
they are willing to accept for giving up irrigation
could vary significantly. Changes in crop prices
may also affect the effectiveness of this policy.
High crop prices make irrigated crop production
more profitable and therefore reduce producers’
willingness to retire or temporarily suspend their
water rights.
Beginning with the 2002 Farm Bill, the
Ground and SurfaceWater Conservation (GSWC)
program was added to the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program. It is a voluntary program,
which provides cost-share assistance and incen-
tive payments to producers who wish to im-
plement water conservation practices. With
millions of dollars spent each year, relatively
little is known about the performance of the
GSWC program. It is of particular interest for
policymakers and stakeholders to know how
much water could be saved through the sub-
sidized conservation programs and how effec-
tive these programs are in saving water.
The objective of this article is to analyze and
quantify the effectiveness of cost-share and in-
centive payment programs in terms of howmuch
water can be saved for each dollar of govern-
ment payment. We intend to estimate the po-
tential water-saving effect when these policies
are applied to a group of irrigators with different
hydrologic conditions. To fulfill this goal, we
constructed a dynamic optimization model in
which a representative producer decides on the
optimal irrigation technology, crop selection,
and water withdrawal. The baseline results are
solved with no policy intervention; we then
calculate and compare the potential water saving
and the cost-effectiveness of government pay-
ments under alternative policy scenarios.
Model Development
Many studies have analyzed the determinants
of technology choices and irrigation water use
(e.g., Caswell and Zilberman, 1986; Buller and
Williams, 1990; Negri and Brooks, 1990). Pre-
vious findings suggest that determinants include
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but are not limited to commodity prices, energy
prices, pump lift, and well capacity. Irrigation
technology selection could affect the amount of
water use as well. Because the investment in ir-
rigation technology is a long-run decision, which
has dynamic effects on future crop selection
and water withdrawals, decisions by the irri-
gator should maximize the sum of current and
discounted future profits.
To model this dynamic optimization problem,
Ding (2005) constructed a nested framework
involving three optimization problems. First is
the optimal choice of irrigation technology, which
requires the irrigator to weigh upfront investment
costs against future benefits, in which the ben-
efits in future periods are not constant as a result
of the declining water level of the aquifer. The
Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957) of the dy-
namic optimization problem is written as
(1)
Vðs,mÞ 5 Max
x50:1,2
Pðs, xÞ  Kðm, xÞf
1bVðs0,m0Þg
where x denotes the discrete choice variable
that equals 0 if the irrigator chooses to stay with
the flood system, 1 if he or she chooses the
center pivot sprinkler method, and 2 if he or she
converts to nonirrigated production. The pa-
rameter b is the discount factor. The function
V(.) represents the maximized (discounted)
total profits that the irrigator could obtain given
the current state (s, m). The state variables in-
clude the saturated thickness of the aquifer (s)
and the age of the existing irrigation system
(m). As the saturated thickness declines, the
depth to the water table increases, which in-
creases pumping costs; meanwhile, well ca-
pacity decreases, which limits the water supply.
Therefore, irrigators with land associated with
an aquifer of lower saturated thickness might
have a greater incentive to adopt more effi-
cient irrigation technologies. However, when
the level of saturated thickness is very low, ir-
rigation could become unprofitable, and the
producer would stop irrigation and switch to
dryland production. A common usable lifetime
of an irrigation system is 15–20 years. Based on
previous research in western Kansas (DeLano
and Williams, 1997), we assume the usable life-
time is 20 years for both the flood and center
pivot systems with no salvage value. An old
system must be completely replaced at the age
of 20 years or else irrigation must be abandoned.
Irrigators with older systems are expected to be
more likely to adopt new and more advanced
irrigation systems.
K(m, x) is the cost of the initial investment,
which depends on the choice of irrigation sys-
tem and the age of the existing system.
(2)
Kðm, xÞ5 Iðm < 20ÞðIðx 5 1ÞK1Þ
1 Iðm5 20Þ½Iðx5 0ÞK0
1 Iðx5 1ÞK1
where I(.) is a binary indicator function that
equals 1 if its argument is true and zero otherwise.
K0 and K1 are the initial investment costs for the
flood and center pivot systems, respectively.
The state variables s9and m9 in Equation (1)
are the expected values of saturated thickness
and age of the irrigation system for the next
period based on current state variables and de-
cisions. Letting z denote the water table decline
rate, the saturated thickness of the aquifer de-
creases by z for the next period (i.e., s9 5 s2 z).
Because the aquifer is a common pool resource,
we assume that an individual irrigator places no
value on any water preserved for future periods
because he or she would reason that all but
a negligible share of the benefit would go to
other users (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980). In this
case, we set z to be a constant value. The age of
the existing system, m, increases by 1 year for
the next period: m9 5 m 1 1.
Given the irrigation technology selected by
solving the optimization problem in Equation
(1), the second step for the profit-maximizing
irrigator is to make the optimal crop choice. In
Equation (1), P(.) is the maximized return to
land and irrigation capital for a given irrigation
technology. A standard parcel in Kansas, and
throughout the High Plains, is a 160-arce square
field, which is usually irrigated from a single
well. Assume the flood system can irrigate the
entire 160-acre field, whereas the center pivot
system only can irrigate a 126-acre circle within
the field with dryland production on the four
corners. So, we write
(3)
P5 160p0Iðx5 0Þ1 ð126p11 34p2ÞIðx5 1Þ
1 160p2Iðx5 2Þ
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where p0, p

1, and p

2 are the maximized profits
per acre under the flood irrigation system, the
center pivot irrigation system, and dryland pro-
duction, respectively. We observe that in many
parts of western Kansas, farmers irrigate only part
of their irrigatable area and leave the rest for
dryland production. As water availability dimin-
ishes, farmers may adjust not only by switching
crops, but also by reducing the irrigated area. To
allow for this possibility, the model selects the
optimal share of irrigatable area to be watered as
well as the optimal crop for each irrigation
technology. Assume there are J alternative crop
choices available, the irrigator makes the crop
choice by solving the subsequent problem:
(4) px 5 Max
d,rj
d
XJ
j51
rjp

xj1 ð1 dÞp2
( )
where pxj is the maximized profit under the
combination of technology x and crop choice j,
d is the share of land irrigated, and rj is the
share of irrigated land planted to crop j.
The final step for the irrigator is to solve for
the optimal irrigation water use (wxj) to maxi-
mize the profit under the selected irrigation
technology and crop (i.e., pxj ). The maximi-
zation problem is written as
(5)
pxj 5 Maxwxj
pjyj  rðu,lÞwxj  Ixj

1 ljðw wxjÞg
where pj and yj are the price and yield of crop j,
respectively; r is the marginal pumping costs,
which is a function of energy price (u) and pump
lift (l); Ixj is the production cost other than
pumping costs (including the cost of seeds,
fertilizer, machinery, labor, etc.); and w is the
water supply constrained by well capacity.1 For
yield, assume that crop yield is a function of
effective water (i.e., the water used by the crop),
denoted e, and that effective water is the product
of water applied through the irrigation system
(w) and irrigation efficiency (hx).
(6) yj5 f jðeÞ5 f jðhxwÞ
The three-staged optimization problem spec-
ified in Equations (1), (4), and (5) can be solved
by backward induction. First, the optimal quan-
tities of irrigation water are selected for all
combinations of crop choices and irrigation
technologies; second, the crop choices are
compared and the most profitable one is de-
termined under a certain irrigation technology;
and finally, the technology choice is made by
comparing the sum of current and discounted
future profits across alternative irrigation tech-
nologies. Numerically, the dynamic optimiza-
tion problem specified in Equation (1) is solved
by using a computational package in Matlab
(MATLAB 6.5, 2002) developed by Miranda
and Fackler (2002).
After reviewing how an irrigator optimally
chooses the irrigation technology without the
assistance of government programs, we now
return to our original question: when the cost-
share assistance and incentive payments are
available, how would the irrigator respond? As-
sume that the starting value of the saturated
thickness is s0 and the age of the initial system is
m0. The profit associated with option one (do not
participate in any government program and stay
with the existing flood irrigation system) is V05
V(x5 0, s0,m0); the profit associated with option
two (share costs with the government and replace
the existing flood irrigation system with a new
center pivot irrigation system) is V1 5 V(x 5 1,
s0, 0) 1 uK1, where u is the cost-share rate;
the profit associated with option three (accept the
government incentive payment and retire the
water right during the contract period2) is
V2 5
XT1
t50
btð160p2Þ1 bTVðx5 2, s1T , m1TÞ1C,
1 For example, if the well capacity is 900 gallons
per minute (GPM), and the water pump runs for 2400
hours in a season, then no more than 4772.7 acre-inches
of water can be pumped. This implies a maximum
application rate of 30 inches per acre for a 160-arce
parcel, or 38 inches per acre for a 126-arce circle. Based
on personal communication with Hecox (2003), the
well capacity in this study is assumed to be directly
related to the saturated thickness by the following
equation: GPM5
ðkÞðsÞðs 10Þ
267
 0:6, where k is the
hydraulic conductivity.
2Assume it is a T-year contract, and the irrigator
is free to resume irrigated production or stay with
dryland production when the contract ends.
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where s1T and m1T are the expected values of
saturated thickness and the irrigation system age
in 10 years, respectively, and C is the compen-
sation payment for retiring the water right. The
irrigator would compare the profits associated
with alternative options and choose the most
profitable one:
(7) MaxðV0, V1, V2Þ
After determining the irrigator’s technology
choice, we can calculate the corresponding crop
choice and water use the planning horizon and
compare the cumulative water use under alter-
native policy scenarios.
Let N denote the number of producers eli-
gible for government cost-share assistance and
incentive payments in the targeted program area.
Assume that N1 producers accept cost-share
assistance (uK1) and convert to the center pivot
irrigation system; that another N2 producers
accept the government incentive payment (C)
and convert to the dryland production; and that
the rest of the N0 5 N 2 N1 2 N2 producers do
not participate in any government program and
stay with the existing flood irrigation system.
The total payments from the government are
(8) L 5 N1ðuK1Þ1N2C
and the total water saved during T years is
(9) W 5
XN1
n51
XT
t51
ðw0nt w1ntÞ1
XN11N2
n5N111
XT
t51
ðw0ntÞ
where wxnt is the optimal water use under
technology x for irrigator n at time t. The co-
efficient of cost-effectiveness (CE), in terms of
the amount of water saved per dollar, is cal-
culated as:
(10) CE 5
W
L
Model Parameters
The model requires several economic, pro-
duction, and hydrologic parameters, including
crop prices, pumping costs, irrigation capital
requirements, production costs, crop response
functions, saturated thickness of the aquifer,
and decline rate of the aquifer. Estimates of
these parameters are based on common crop
production practices, hydrologic characteristics,
and weather conditions specific to irrigators in
the Kansas High Plains. Table 1 summarizes the
major model parameters used in this study.
The Crop Production Functions
For this study, assume corn and sorghum are
the two alternative crop choices for irrigators.
Both are major irrigated crops in the Kansas
High Plains. Corn is the dominant irrigated crop,
planted on over 50% of all irrigated acreage.
Sorghum is a water-extensive crop and is usually
regarded as a replacement for corn (a water-
intensive crop) when there are limited water
supplies. Assume the production function in
Equation (6) takes a quadratic functional form:
(11) y 5 a01a1e1a2e2
This function is estimated for corn and sor-
ghum, respectively, using the data generated by
the Crop Water Allocator Software (2004). This
programwas designed by Kansas State University
Research and Extension to simulate irrigated
Table 1. Values of Model Parameters Used in
Simulations
Parameters Values
Coefficients of production function
Corn (bushel)
a0 33.4525
a1 16.0891
a2 –0.4023
Grain sorghum (bushel)
a0 42.6486
a1 7.1289
a2 –0.1963
Nonenergy irrigation cost ($/acre)
Corn 58.97
Grain sorghum 37.53
Nonwater production costs ($/acre)
Corn 426.93
Grain sorghum 259.31
Initial investment cost of
irrigation system ($/parcel)
Flood 5,280
Center pivot 59,976
Corn price ($/bushel) 4.39
Grain sorghum price ($/bushel) 3.93
Natural gas price ($/mcf) 12.13
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crop yields under growth conditions typical of
western Kansas. The default relationships be-
tween yield and irrigation built into the program
are based on the Kansas Water Budget Model
developed by Stone et al. (1995), which was in
turn calibrated to yield data obtained at field
trials in western Kansas. The parameters (as)
were estimated using ordinary least squares and
the results are reported in Table 1.
Effective water (e) is the product of the
applied water (w) and the irrigation efficiency
(h). In western Kansas, water application effi-
ciency with the flood system is generally in the
range of 50–75% depending on the field char-
acteristics, whereas with the center pivot irri-
gation system, it is in the range of 75–95%. For
this study, we set the irrigation efficiency to be
60 and 90% for the flood irrigation and center
pivot irrigation systems, respectively.
Prices and Costs
Data on crop prices and production costs are
4-year (2007–2010) averages from Kansas State
University Extension crop budgets in those years
(see Dumler et al., 2010a, 2010b). The average
prices of corn and grain sorghum are $4.39/bu
and $3.93/bu, respectively. The profit from
dryland crop production, for simplicity, is set to
be the cash rent for dryland crops in the Ex-
tension budgets; the 4-year average value is
$32/acre. Nonwater production costs include
expenses for seed, herbicide, insecticide, fer-
tilizer, crop consulting, machinery, and interest.
Nonenergy irrigation costs include repairs and
maintenance costs as well as labor cost. These
costs are calculated for each crop choice. Irri-
gation system investment costs are taken from
Dumler, O’Brien, and Rogers (2007). The ini-
tial investment cost of the flood irrigation sys-
tem is much lower than that of the center pivot
irrigation system. The cost is $5,280 (K0) for
the flood system and $59,976 (K1) for the
center pivot system.
The pumping cost (r) is assumed to be a
function of fuel price (u) and pump lift (l) set
r 5 udl, where d is the energy required to lift
one unit of water one unit of distance. Because
natural gas is the most popular fuel used in
western Kansas for pumping water, its price is
used to represent the fuel price in the model. The
4-year (2007–2010) average price of natural gas
is calculated based on data from the Department
of Energy/Energy Information Administration.
Assuming that the pump plant is 75% efficient
(this is distinct from the water application effi-
ciency of the delivery system), 0.000155 million
cubic feet (mcf) of natural gas is required to lift
1 acre-inch of water 1 inch (i.e., d5 0.000155)
(Rogers and Alam, 1999).
Hydrologic Characteristics
The pump lift is the sum of the depth to the
water table (dtw, measured in feet) and the ver-
tical lift equivalent of the pressure of thewater at
the exit from the delivery system (measured in
pounds per square inch [psi]). The water pres-
sure is converted to feet by a conversion factor
of 2.31 feet per psi. Assume that the pressure is
5 psi for the flood system and 20 psi for the center
pivot system (Williams et al., 1997). The depth
to the water table is the distance from the land
surface to the groundwater level. As the level of
saturated thickness decreases, the pump lift
increases correspondingly.
The decline rate of the water table would
be affected by total groundwater withdrawal.
However, because of the common pool prob-
lem, an individual irrigator would assume the
decline rate to be exogenous to his or her water
extraction. We assume that irrigators use his-
torical records to forecast the future water table
decline rate. For this study, we use a constant
decline rate of 6 inches per year, which is the
average decline rate of the Ogallala aquifer in
Kansas during the 1990s (Kansas Geological
Survey, 2000).
Results
The optimization model was used to simulate
irrigators’ decisions under different policy sce-
narios and under a large set of starting values of
the state variables: saturated thickness and the age
of the existing flood irrigation system. To illus-
trate the nature of the model’s outputs in each
execution, consider the optimal results with no
policy interventions for an irrigator with a 10-
year old flood irrigation system. If the starting
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value of saturated thickness of the aquifer is
greater than 90 feet, the model predicts this irri-
gator will continue using flood irrigation until the
saturated thickness drops to 90 feet, at which
point he or she will immediately convert to the
more efficient center pivot irrigation system. If
the initial saturated thickness of the aquifer is
between 59 and 90 feet, the gain from the irri-
gation efficiency improvement is diminished by
the limited well capacity. In this case, the flood
system will continue to be used until irrigation is
abandoned, because the gains from the conver-
sion are not enough to cover the initial investment
cost of the center pivot system. In either of these
cases, irrigation will continue until saturated
thickness drops to under 30 feet; at this point,
irrigation becomes too costly and the irrigator
should convert to dryland crop production. In this
analysis, we describe how the change of aquifer-
saturated thickness affects a representative irri-
gator’s choicewhen the starting value of the flood
irrigation system’s age equals 10 years (i.e.,m05
10). As the age of the existing system increases
and nears its usable life of 20 years, irrigators
would be more willing to invest in the more ef-
ficient center pivot irrigation systems.
This study is intended to investigate the ef-
fect of water conservation programs when they
are applied to a group of irrigators with different
hydrologic conditions. Irrigators with land on
aquifers with different saturated thicknesses
would respond differently to alternative con-
servation programs and would require differ-
ent cost-share rates to make the conversion to
more efficient irrigation technologies or in-
centive payments to convert to dryland crop
production. However, policymakers usually
have no clear information on each irrigator’s
well or they might be unable to differentiate the
irrigators as a result of political reasons. Re-
gardless of the reason, existing programs usually
offer a fixed cost-share or incentive rate for
which all irrigators are eligible. To understand
how different producers respond to these uniform
instruments, we model the optimal responses for
a group of irrigators with initial saturated thick-
ness following a normal distribution.
Assume that there are 100 eligible irrigators
in one of the program target areas, i.e., n5 100.
Most irrigation wells in western Kansas have
a water level ranging from 70 to 130 feet, av-
eraging 100 feet. Therefore, we assume that the
saturated thickness for each irrigator is a random
draw from a normal distribution with a mean of
100 and a variance of 100. Similarly, the age of
the existing irrigation system is a (uniformly
distributed) random number drawn from one
to 20. For each irrigator, we first determine
whether he or she will enroll in any conserva-
tion program, and then, if he or she will enroll,
how much water will be saved during a 10-year
contract period. The results from each irrigator
are summarized to obtain the enrollment rate,
total government payments, and total water
saved. These values are then used to calculate
the cost-effectiveness as specified in Equation
(10). The cost-effectiveness we calculated is
interpreted as the amount of groundwater saved
during the 10-year period for $1 spent today. To
even out the variability of random draws, this
procedure is repeated 100 times, and the final
reported results are the average values from the
100 iterations. The baseline results are solved
under no policy intervention and then compared
Table 2. Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Conservation Programs under Different Cost-Share
Rates and Incentive Payment Levels
Cost-Share Rates
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Incentive payments ($)
0 0.000 0.073 0.095 0.096 0.088 0.081
20,000 0.000 0.073 0.095 0.096 0.088 0.081
40,000 0.000 0.073 0.095 0.096 0.088 0.081
60,000 0.000 0.073 0.095 0.096 0.088 0.081
80,000 0.001 0.073 0.095 0.096 0.088 0.081
100,000 0.001 0.073 0.095 0.096 0.088 0.081
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with the simulated results under alternative cost-
share rates and incentive payment levels.
The baseline results indicate that, with no
policy intervention, the 100 irrigators would
withdraw a total of 3,517,026 acre-inches
(293,086 acre-feet) of water during the 10-year
period. In Tables 2, 3, and 4, we report the cost-
effectiveness, total water saved, and total gov-
ernment expenditures under different cost-share
rates and incentive payment levels. For example,
the first row in Table 2 presents the values of the
cost-effectiveness when the incentive payment
equals zero and the cost-share rate increases
from 0 to 50%. Without incentive payment,
the highest cost-effectiveness (0.096) is reached
when the cost-share rate is set at 30%, and the
resulted water saving is 67,327 acre-inches,
which is approximately 2% of the baseline water
withdrawal. The first column in Table 2 reports
the values of cost-effectiveness when the cost-
share rate equals zero and the incentive payment
ranges from $0 to $100,000. The incentive pay-
ment program seems to be ineffective. Few irri-
gators are willing to accept the payment and
temporarily retire their water rights by switching
to dryland production even when the incentive
payment is as high as $100,000. This is partly the
result of the high prevailing grain prices, which
makes irrigated crop production more profitable.
Suppose prices of corn and grain sorghum
are reduced by 10% (Table 5). The incentive
payment program then becomes more effective
than the cost-share program. The highest cost-
effectiveness (0.187) is reached when the in-
centive payment is $100,000 and the cost-share
rate is zero. If prices of corn and grain sorghum
are reduced by 20% (Table 6), even higher cost-
effectiveness (0.559) will be achieved with a
lower level of incentive payment ($40,000).
In this analysis, irrigators’ saturated thick-
ness is assumed to follow a normal distribution
with the mean of 100 feet. In the real world,
program areas may have an average saturated
thickness greater or lower than this value. It is
important to know how these changes might
affect the cost-effectiveness of alternative con-
servation programs. Consider a group of 100
irrigators with an initial saturated thickness
following a normal distribution with a mean of
90 and a variance of 100. Following the same
procedure, we simulate the total water-saving
and government payments under alternative
Table 3. Total Water Savings (acre-inches) of Alternative Conservation Programs under Different
Cost-Share Rates and Incentive Payment Levels
Cost-Share Rates
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Incentive payments ($)
0 0 11,293 37,759 67,327 90,923 111,741
20,000 0 11,293 37,759 67,327 90,923 111,741
40,000 0 11,293 37,759 67,327 90,923 111,741
60,000 0 11,293 37,759 67,327 90,923 111,741
80,000 114 11,407 37,759 67,327 90,923 111,741
100,000 114 11,407 37,873 67,440 91,037 111,855
Table 4. Total Government Expenditures ($) of Alternative Conservation Programs under Different
Cost-Share Rates and Incentive Payment Levels
Cost-Share Rates
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Incentive payments ($)
0 0 154,018 396,441 700,820 1,032,787 1,390,244
20,000 0 154,018 396,441 700,820 1,032,787 1,390,244
40,000 0 154,018 396,441 700,820 1,032,787 1,390,244
60,000 0 154,018 396,441 700,820 1,032,787 1,390,244
80,000 800 154,758 396,441 700,820 1,032,787 1,390,244
100,000 1,000 154,958 397,321 701,640 1,033,547 1,390,944
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policy scenarios. Table 7 reports the values of
cost-effectiveness. The incentive payment
program is now more effective than the cost-
share program when facing irrigators with
shallower saturated thickness. The highest
cost-effectiveness (0.065) is reached when the
incentive payment is $100,000 and the cost-
share rate is zero. This result is consistent with
our expectation that irrigators with poorer
hydrologic conditions expect low returns from
continuing irrigation and therefore would be
more likely to accept the incentive payment
for the conversion to dryland production.
In a similar analysis, we calculate the cost-
effectiveness of alternative policies assuming
they are available to a group of irrigators with
an average aquifer saturated thickness of 110
feet. As shown by the results in Table 8, the
incentive payment program is now completely
ineffective because no one is willing to par-
ticipate, whereas the cost-share program be-
comes more effective than before. The highest
cost-effectiveness (0.148) is reached when the
cost-share rate is set at 20% and the incentive
payment is zero.
In sum, many irrigators in thin areas of the
aquifer will find it unprofitable to adopt more
efficient irrigation technologies without policy
intervention. However, with cost-share assistance,
these producers might be able to afford the
cost-efficiency improvements and stay in irri-
gation longer and eventually pump more water
out of the aquifer. Therefore, a cost-share pro-
gram might not be a good policy choice in such
areas. The incentive payment program and the
cost-share program should be used to target
different irrigator groups. In areas with low sat-
urated thickness, the incentive payment program
is more effective; whereas in areas with relatively
higher water availability, the cost-share program
could be a better choice. We also note that the
coexistence of these two programs might either
increase or decrease the cost-effectiveness of
water savings. In Table 7, when the incentive
payment equals $80,000, increasing the cost-
share rate from 0% to 10% improves the cost-
effectiveness from 0.027 to 0.042. However,
when the incentive payment equals $100,000, the
same increase in the cost-share rate reduces the
cost-effectiveness from 0.065 to 0.049.
Table 5. Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Conservation Programs under Different Cost-Share
Rates and Incentive Payment Levels When Crop Prices Decrease by 10%
Cost-Share Rates
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Incentive payments ($)
0 0.000 0.099 0.100 0.101 0.100 0.096
20,000 0.000 0.099 0.100 0.101 0.100 0.096
40,000 0.003 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.100 0.096
60,000 0.025 0.104 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.096
80,000 0.108 0.122 0.108 0.104 0.101 0.097
100,000 0.187 0.154 0.124 0.111 0.105 0.099
Table 6. Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Conservation Programs under Different Cost-Share
Rates and Incentive Payment Levels When Crop Prices Decrease by 20%
Cost-Share Rates
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Incentive payments ($)
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.056 0.073
20,000 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.058 0.068 0.079
40,000 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.383 0.155 0.106
60,000 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.475
80,000 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.411
100,000 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354
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Conclusions
Irrigated crop production in western Kansas
depends largely on groundwater derived from
the Ogallala aquifer. However, excessive water
withdrawals and low recharge rates have led to
rapid decline of the water table and the near
exhaustion of the aquifer in some areas. Many
policy alternatives for conserving irrigation
water have been proposed and some of them
have already been put in practice. This study
has investigated two commonly discussed pol-
icies: 1) a cost-share program for improving
irrigation efficiency (e.g., shifting from flood to
central pivot irrigation methods); and 2) an
incentive payment program for temporarily
retiring water rights (e.g., shifting from flood
irrigation to dryland production). The conser-
vation effects of more efficient technologies are
theoretically undetermined, because irrigators
may respond to the higher irrigation efficiency
by increasing net irrigation, irrigating more
acres, or even planting more water-intensive
crops. Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness
of the cost-share program empirically, we de-
veloped a dynamic model to project a repre-
sentative irrigator’s water use, crop selection,
and choice of irrigation technology under typ-
ical conditions of the Kansas High Plains lo-
cated within the Ogallala aquifer. Dryland
production is modeled as an irrigation tech-
nology choice alongside the flood irrigation
system and the center pivot irrigation system,
allowing us to evaluate the effectiveness of the
incentive payment program within the same
framework.
The results suggest that both policies can be
effective in reducing irrigation water use, al-
though their effectiveness is small and limited
under certain conditions. High prevailing crop
prices greatly reduce irrigators’ incentive to give
up irrigation and therefore cause low enrollment
and ineffectiveness of the incentive payment
program. The cost-share program is less effec-
tive than the incentive payment program in areas
with low saturated thickness, whereas in areas
Table 7. Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Conservation Programs under Different Cost-Share
Rates and Incentive Payment Levels When the Average Aquifer Saturated Thickness Equals
90 Feet
Cost-Share Rates
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Incentive payments ($)
0 0.000 0.040 0.050 0.048 0.044 0.039
20,000 0.000 0.040 0.050 0.048 0.044 0.039
40,000 0.000 0.040 0.050 0.048 0.044 0.039
60,000 0.005 0.040 0.050 0.048 0.044 0.039
80,000 0.027 0.042 0.051 0.048 0.044 0.039
100,000 0.065 0.049 0.053 0.049 0.045 0.040
Table 8. Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Conservation Programs under Different Cost-Share
Rates and Incentive Payment Levels When the Average Aquifer Saturated Thickness Equals
110 Feet
Cost-Share Rates
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Incentive payments ($)
0 0.000 0.119 0.148 0.141 0.127 0.112
20,000 0.000 0.119 0.148 0.141 0.127 0.112
40,000 0.000 0.119 0.148 0.141 0.127 0.112
60,000 0.000 0.119 0.148 0.141 0.127 0.112
80,000 0.000 0.119 0.148 0.141 0.127 0.112
100,000 0.000 0.119 0.148 0.141 0.127 0.112
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with relatively thick saturated depths, the cost-
share program could be a better choice. The
results suggest that the overall water-saving
effectiveness can be improved when different
policy tools are considered under different
conditions. Future research can explore optimal
ways of targeting policies by restricting eligi-
bility depending on producer types.
Our conclusions are derived from the simu-
lated results based on the economic conditions,
production practices, and hydrologic character-
istics typical of the Kansas High Plains. Our
findings are important for policymakers in the
evaluation of effectiveness of alternative water-
conserving policies while also providing valu-
able information for designing future programs.
One limitation of the model is that we assume
prices, investment costs, and hydroclimatic var-
iables to be constant or to change at a constant
rate over time. Although including stochastic
variables into the model could add realism, the
computation effort required to solve a dy-
namic model grows exponentially with the
number of state variables, and this problem is
compounded if the added state variables are
stochastic. In the future, we expect to predict
and compare different policy results under al-
ternative price scenarios and changing hydro-
climatic conditions. By changing the values
of model parameters, our analyses can also be
applied to other regions for analyzing similar
problems.
[Received December 2010; Accepted December 2011.]
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